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LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO MINORS'
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRY
Shields v. Gross
563 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
I. INTRODUCTION - THE PARADOX
Current laws, created legislatively or by judicial fiat fail to ad-
equately represent the best interests of the child entertainer. Re-
cently, the California and New York legislatures have enacted laws
which demonstrate an increasing awareness of the need for protec-
tion of minors' rights in entertainment contracts. These statutes
have required judicially-approved contracts with stipulations for
the establishment of trust funds for minors. However, as this arti-
cle propounds, these enactments are insufficient to afford complete
protection to minors. Children deserve extraordinary legal protec-
tion because "[they] may be described as the silent minority; they
are economically disadvantaged and have no independent financial
power; their legal status is essentially passive with the exception of
limited state protection."' Children are vulnerable to exploitation
by an adult-governed culture. This is especially so in the highly
commercial realm of entertainment. For example, children can be
particularly susceptible to parental aspirations. "It is feared that
as an infant he may well be under the complete influence of an
adult or may be unable to act in any manner which would allow
him to defend his rights and interests.' 2 In addition, the child has
no legal power to exercise his or her own free will.
The Institute of Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association's standards relating to minors' rights supports the con-
tention that recently enacted statutes are inadequate.3 The Insti-
tute has stated that a new legislative approach to these rights
would be welcome; "one that would provide protection only to
those minors who may not be able to adequately care for their own
financial interests, while providing stability and predictability to
adults who must deal with them - this being especially true in the
1. VARDIN & BRODY, CHILDRENS RIGHTS - CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE XV (1979).
2. 28 N.Y. Jur., Infants, §3, pp. 221-22 (1963).
3. Institute of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice
Standards, Standards Relating to Minors, Hon. Irving R. Kaufman, Chairman, p. 112-13.
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area of minors involved in the entertainment field."'4
II. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Under common law, a minor had the right to disaffirm a con-
tract. A minor could also disaffirm a contract executed by another
on his or her behalf. As a general trend, cases relating to the en-
tertainment industry upheld this common law approach with re-
gard to children entering into contracts.
During the early stages of motion picture production, children
were often signed to multi-year contracts by the major studios.
This was a significant investment of both money and effort since
the studios spent a great deal on training and publicity.5 Because
of the financial commitment undertaken by these studios, they
could not risk disaffirmance by minors. Thus, filmmakers con-
tracted with the minor's parents. In 1927, the California legislature
provided for a proceeding whereby the superior court could ap-
prove the minor's contract and make it non-disaffirmable by the
minor.e Section 36 of the California Civil Code was a major legisla-
4. See Vardin & Brody, supra note 1.
5. CURRY, THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH THE MINOR UNDER CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE
SECTION 36: Dos THE "COOGAN LAW" ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE MINOR? 7 J. Juv. L. 95
(1983).
6. Cal. Civ. Code §§36, 36.1, 36.2 (West 1982). Provision pertaining to judicial ap-
proval in minor's contract to render dramatic ... services:
(1) At the time of the execution of this contract, [artist] represents and war-
rants to [producer] that [he or shel is a minor pursuant to the provisions of
section 25 of the Civil Code of the state of California.
(2) In accordance with the provisions of section 36 of the Civil Code of the
state of California, this contract must be approved by the [Superior Court] of
the county of [], where [artist] [resides or is employed]. [If minor neither
resides in nor is employed in California, this contract must be approved by the
Superior Court in county where any party to contract has its principal office in
California for transaction of business].
(3) It is agreed that should the [Superior Court] fail to approve the contract
within [number] days from the date hereof, the [producer] may at its option,
cancel the agreement without further liability of any nature to [artist], but with-
out waiving any rights regarding professional services performed by [artist] prior
to such cancellation.
§36.1
Contracts for particular services; trust or savings plan; net earnings; taxes:
In any order made by the Superior Court approving a contract of a minor
for the purposes mentioned in section 36 of this code, the court shall have power
notwithstanding the provisions of any other statute, to require the setting aside
and preservation for the benefit of the minor, either in a trust fund or in such
other savings plan as the court shall approve, of such portion of the net earnings
of the minor, not exceeding one-half thereof, as the court may deem just and
proper, and the court may withhold approval of such contract until the parent or
parents or guardian, as the case may be, shall execute and file with the court his
[Vol. 1:145
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The need for §36 was made clear by the case of Warner Broth-
ers v. Brodel.7 In this case, a minor, seventeen year-old Joan Bro-
del, entered, with the court's approval, into an agreement to render
services as a motion picture actress for a period of fifty-two weeks.8
The employer was given options to extend the terms of employ-
ment for six additional successive periods of fifty-two weeks each,
at a progressively higher salary. When she attained majority, the
minor refused to render further services and entered into a con-
tract with other motion picture producers. The court held that the
statute precluded disaffirmance not only during minority but also
upon attaining majority."
Section 36 of the California Civil Code was expanded as a re-
sult of a 1938 case involving child actor Jackie Coogan (who later
became the Addams Family's Uncle Fester) and his mother. Coo-
gan's mother spent her son's movie earnings,10 an action which re-
futes a popular argument used by many courts that the parents
generally enter a contract with the child's best interests in mind. It
should be remembered that under common law, parents were
granted domain over the child actor's possessions. Jackie Coogan's
case, however, was a clear example of a situation in which a court
had to intervene in order to protect the child from parental bad
judgment.
or her written consent to the making of such order. For the purpose of this sec-
tion the net earnings of the minor shall be deemed to be the total sum received
for the services of the minor pursuant to such contract less the following: All
sums required by law to be paid as taxes to any government or governmental
agency; reasonable sums expended for the support, care, maintenance, educa-
tion, and training of the minor; fees and expenses paid in connection with pro-
curing such contract or maintaining the employment of the minor; and the fees
of attorneys for services rendered in connection with the contract and other bus-
iness of the minor.
§36.2
Continuing jurisdiction over, and termination of, minor's trust or savings plan:
The Superior Court shall have continuing jurisdiction over any trust or
other savings plan established pursuant to section 36.1 and shall have power at
any time upon good cause shown, to order that any such trust or other savings
plan shall be amended and terminated, notwithstanding the provisions of any
declaration of trust or any other savings plan. Such order shall be made only
after such reasonable notice to the beneficiary and to the parent or parents or
guardian, if any, as may be fixed by the court, with opportunity to all such par-
ties to appear and be heard.
7. Warner Brothers Pictures v. Brodel, 31 Cal.2d 766, 192 P.2d 949, cert. denied, 335
U.S. 844, reh'g denied, 335 U.S. 873 (1948).
8. Id. at 950.
9. Id. at 951.
10. The work of the 1939 California Legislature, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1939).
1984]
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In 1939, the California legislature added Civil Code §§36.1 and
36.2. Section 36.1 gave the court power to require the establish-
ment of a trust fund for the minor as a prerequisite to the court
granting approval of a contract. Section 36.2 gave the court contin-
uing jurisdiction over this fund.11
Today, however, producers are generally not seeking court-ap-
proved contracts because the trend is toward short-term contracts
and producers are not afraid of disaffirmance." As a result, chil-
dren's earnings are not being afforded the protection of savings
funds. Consequently, children are once again susceptible to ex-
ploitation resulting from either bad faith or bad judgment.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF NEW YORK LAW
The 1983 New York case of Shields v. Gross provides an ex-
amination without resolution of the inherent problems involved in
the delicate balancing of children's rights with contract predict-
ability and stability."' Seventeen year-old actress and model
Brooke Shields brought an action against photographer Garry
Gross seeking damages and injunctive relief to prevent the photog-
rapher from using photographs taken when she was ten years old,
some of them taken wile she posed nude in a bathtub. Teri
Shields, Brooke's mother and legal guardian, had consented to the
taking of these potogrphs in a 1975 agreement between Gross and
herself.'L 4 It was intended that these photos would be used in a
publication entitled "Portfolio 8" (later renamed "Sugar and
Spice").' The contract provided in part:
I hereby give the photographer, his legal representatives, and as-
signs, those for whom the photographer is acting, and those act-
ing with his permission, or his employees, the right and permis-
sion to copyright and/or use, reuse and/or publish, and republish
photographic pictures or portraits of me, or in which I may be
distorted in character, or form, in conjunction with my own or a
fictitious name, on reproductions thereof in color, or black and
white made through any media by the photographer at his stu-
dio or elsewhere, for any purpose whatsoever; including the use
of any printed matter in conjunction therewith.
11. Cal. Civ. Code, §§36.1, 36.2 (West 1982).
12. Curry, supra note 5.
13. Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d 108 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd. 563 F. Supp. 1253
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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I hereby waive any right to inspect or approve the finished pho-
tograph or advertising copy or printed matter that may be used
in conjunction therewith or to the eventual use that it might be
applied."
The New York Court of Appeals held that Brooke Shields
could not maintain an action against the photographer where her
mother had effectively consented and where the consents were un-
restricted as to time and use. The court upheld the consent, stating
that a parent who wishes to limit the publicity and exposure of a
child need only limit the use authorized in the consent. The court
held in effect that an injunction was not permissible because Teri
Shields had given unlimited consent to the future use of the
photographs.7
The Shields case provides insight into the judicial approach
used by the New York courts regarding disaffirmance. The Su-
preme Court, Trial Term of New York County, granted Shields a
limited injunction, permanently enjoining the photographer from
using or selling the pictures in a pornographic nature. The Su-
preme Court, Appellate Division, modified this ruling, granting a
permanent injunction from any use relating to advertising or
trade.18 The court of appeals held that, despite the fact that
Shields' mother's consent was found to be valid by both courts,
further release of the photos was restricted. The New York Court
of Appeals refused to enjoin Gross's use of the photographs, em-
phasizing that the only issue of law presented for adjudication was
whether the consents given by Teri Shields were valid. Finally,
Shields took the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, filing the complaint on the first
business day after the expiration of the state's injunction. She as-
serted for the first time, that the distribution of the photographs
would infringe her federal constitutional right of privacy.A9
The United States district court denied her motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, basing its decision on equitable grounds be-
cause "[p]laintiff's counsel has conducted this litigation and timed
this application for a preliminary injunctive relief in a manner
designed to impose unnecessary unfairness on the defendants."20
In addition, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the
16. Id.
17. Id. at 112.
18. Id. at 110.
19. Shields v. Gross, 563 F. Supp. at 1254.
20. Id. at 1253.
1984]
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test of irreparable harm necessary for entitlement to preliminary
injunctive relief. Another component part of this test requires that
the plaintiff "must show either likelihood of success on the merits
or serious questions for litigation with the balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in her favor.""
The court outlined the plaintiff's argument: first, that "the
First and other Amendments to the Constitution protect a right of
privacy and, second,. . that the state court's refusal to invalidate
the consent is governmental action violating this right."" The
court stated that no decisions supported the existence of a cause of
action which would result in "prior restraint of a publication
through court censorship" in the guise of first amendment
protection."
Although Shields claimed that she would suffer irreparable
harm, embarrassment and personal distress from the photograph's
publication, the court held that the balance of hardships scale did
not tip in Shields's favor.2 4 The court took julicial notice of the
fact that there had already been substantial dissemination of these
nude photographs. In addition, the court noted that "much of
plaintiff's recent commercial activity upon which her fame is based
has been far more sexually suggestive than the photographs which
have been shown to the court,"2 ' and therefore, that the plaintiff's
claim of harm was diminished by the "development of her career
projecting a sexually provocative image.""
Lastly, the district court stated that the:
Defendant's victory in the state courts has been a financial dis-
aster for them. After two years of injunction and one completed
lawsuit, plaintiff has not yet shown entitlement to the relief she
seeks. Defendants have suffered substantial harm which would
be compounded by further interim injunctive relief. They have
been unfairly burdened by the litigation strategy of plaintiff's
lawyers. I find that the balance of hardship favors the defen-
dants. They are now entitled to be free of court restraint.' 7
The appellate division strictly construed §§50 and 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law.28 Section 50 is penal and makes it a




25. Id. at 1257.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Curry, supra note 5.
[Vol. 1:145
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misdemeanor to use a living person's name, portrait or picture for
advertising purposes without prior "written consent."29 Section 51
is remedial and creates a related civil cause of action on behalf of
the injured party, permitting relief by injunction or damages."0
The court said that the applicable sections of the Civil Rights Law
were in derogation of the common law - that the parents' consent
is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are
necessary to effectuate the legislative intent." The court also dis-
missed the notion that the consents were void because the contract
was not 'court-approved as is required by §3-105 of the General
Obligations Law of New York.32 While doing so, the court drew a
distinction between child artists and athletes, and child models,
noting that given the sporadic nature of modeling and the rela-
tively minute fees involved (due to the fact that most modeling
contracts are short-term), judicial approval of child modeling con-
tracts was inappropriate.33 The court found that the establishment
of a trust fund under these circumstances would be unnecessary.
Finally, the court emphasized that an obvious remedy was
available. A parent who wishes to limit the publicity and exposure
of his or her child under a contract need only limit the use author-
ized in the consent. No immunity is extended where consent has
been effected. 4
The dissent in Shields viewed the problem from a different
perspective, emphasizing a public policy concern. Judge Jasen ar-
gued that at issue was the right of an infant to disaffirm her
mother's consent with respect to the future unrestricted use of
photographs taken of her. The majority held, in Jasen's view, that
once a parent consents to the invasion of "privacy of a child, the
child is forever bound by that consent and may never disaffirm the
continued invasion of his or her privacy, even where the continued
invasion of the child's privacy may cause the child enormous em-
barrassment, distress and humiliation."38
Jasen believed that the interests of society and the state in
protecting its children must be placed above any concern for trade
or commercialism, and noted that "the state has the right and in-




33. Shields v. Gross, 448 N.E.2d at 111.




Boehm and Guzman: Legislative and Judicial Approaches to Minors' Contractual Rights
Published by Institutional Repository, 1984
152 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
deed the obligation to afford extraordinary protection to minors."'
He reiterated the common law rule which allowed disaffirmance,
and interpreted §50 as not derogating this common law right. 7
Jasen believed that the broad right to disaffirm was granted in or-
der to afford the minor as much protection against exploitation as
possible."
Jasen asserted that for a child to be fully protected, it was
necessary for him to maintain the right to disaffirm. Jasen argued
that this common law right was based on the concept that children
cannot be fully aware of the potential ramifications of entering into
a contract. Allowing a minor the right to disaffirm a contract is
merely one method that common law developed to resolve those
inequities and afford children the protection they require to com-
pensate for their immaturity."'
IV. REFORM, NOT REVOLUTION
The conclusions reached by the dissenting opinion appear to
be valid. The majority strictly construed the statute and failed to
consider the additional areas of potential future concern to those
in the entertainment field. The child is thus forever bound by a
parent's or guardian's decision even if that decision later appears
to be exploitative or detrimental to the child's best interests. Fur-
thermore, the child is absolutely and completely precluded from
exercising any self-determination or free will to disaffirm, even af-
ter he or she reaches majority.
The parent is the primary guardian of the child's welfare and
interest. Should the parent fail, however, the state assumes the
role of parens patriae, thus standing in the shoes of the parent.
Therefore, if over the long run, a parent demonstrates bad judg-
ment, the child should not continue to be haunted by this. Even
where embarrassment, distress and humiliation are not shown, a
child, upon reaching majority, should be allowed to disaffirm a
contract entered into on his or her behalf by another, regardless of
whether the child has received any benefit. The California and
New York legislatures have acted to extend the protection in rec-
ognition of this paradox - contract predictibility and stability ver-
sus minor's rights. Judge Jasen's view that children were afforded
more protection under the common law is correct. A return to the
36. Id.
37. Id. at 113.
38. Id.
39. 28 N.Y. Jut., Infants, §3, pp. 221-22 (1963).
[Vol. 1:145
8
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 10
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol1/iss1/10
1984] CHILDREN'S CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS 153
common law is not, however, recommended. Reform, not revolu-
tion, is required.
A potential alternative would be to require court approval of
all contracts involving child entertainers, regardless of their dura-
tion. Court approval exists today as an option. It should exist as a
requirement and non-compliance should render the contract void
ab initio. Another possible modification would be to allow for dis-
affirmance or reaffirmance upon attaining majority. Public policy
considerations demand these reforms because of the societal needs
for extraordinary protection of minors and for preserving the fun-
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